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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Kloeckner v. Solis,
133 S. Ct. 596 (2012)
Synopsis:
Petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner, an employee of the Department
of Labor (DOL), filed a complaint with the agency’s civil rights
office, alleging that the agency had engaged in unlawful sex and age
discrimination by subjecting her to a hostile work environment. 1
Before her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
hearing took place, the DOL terminated petitioner’s employment. 2
Petitioner subsequently filed an appeal to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB), claiming that her termination was a
discriminatory removal. 3
Petitioner made a request for a
consolidation of her two cases and the proceeding took place before
the EEOC judge, who terminated her proceeding on the basis of her
bad-faith discovery misconduct. 4 After her appeal of the EEOC
decision lost before DOL, petitioner sought MSPB review of the
DOL’s decision. 5 MSPB dismissed petitioner’s appeal as untimely. 6
Petitioner then brought this action against DOL in the U.S. District
Court of Eastern Missouri. 7 The court dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction, holding that under section 7703(b)(1) of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 8 (CSRA), petitioner should have sought
review in the Federal Circuit because petitioner’s claims had been
dismissed on procedural grounds. 9 The district court further stated
that, pursuant to section 7703(b)(2) of the same act, only
discrimination cases that MSPB had decided on the merits could go

1

Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596, 602 (2012).
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 603.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
5 U.S.C. § 7703 (b)(1) (2012).
9
Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 603.
2
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to district court. 10 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding. 11 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a federal employee who has an
agency action claim that is appealable to the MSPB based on an
antidiscrimination statute listed in section 7703(b)(1) should seek
review in district court, rather than the Federal Circuit, regardless of
whether the MSPB decided her case on procedural grounds or on the
merits. 12
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
A basic understanding of the statutory framework is required
to understand the facts of this case. CSRA provides federal
employees procedural protections based on the severity of the
adverse employment action taken against the employee. 13 An
employee has the right to appeal to an independent adjudicator of
federal employment disputes called the MSPB, but only when the
employer’s action is particularly serious—such as for a termination
of employment or a reduction of pay. 14 When the employee couples
such a claim with a charge against the agency for discrimination
based on a federal statute, such as Title VII 15 or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 16 she is said to have
brought a “mixed case,” as defined by section 7702(a)(1). 17 A mixed
case may proceed in many ways, by either (1) the filing of a
discrimination complaint with the employee’s agency, from which a
decision is appealable to the MSPB or by suing the agency in district
court; or (2) the initiation of a suit with the MSPB, from which a
decision is appealable to the EEOC or by judicial review. 18 The issue
in this case concerns where that post-MSPB judicial review should
take place—in the Federal Circuit or in federal district court. 19
10

Id.
Id.
12
Id. at 607.
13
Id. at 600.
14
Id.
15
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (2006).
16
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
17
Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 601.
18
Id.
19
Id.
11
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Section 7703(b)(1) of CSRA provides that a petition to
review the MSPB’s final decision shall be filed in the Federal Circuit,
and section 7703(b)(2) spells out the exception to this basic rule:
cases of discrimination subject to section 7702 (“mixed cases”), shall
be filed under the enforcement sections of antidiscrimination statutes,
under which plaintiffs are authorized to bring suit in federal district
court. 20
The facts here establish a mixed case. In June 2005,
petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the agency’s
civil rights office, alleging that her employer, DOL, had engaged in
unlawful sex and age discrimination by subjecting her to a hostile
work environment. 21 Because petitioner did not suffer a sufficiently
serious personnel action, her case was not appealable to the MSPB,
and she was assigned an EEOC hearing instead. 22 DOL discharged
her a month later, before the EEOC hearing took place. 23 Petitioner
believed the agency’s action was discriminatory, which—coupled
with her previous claim—gave her a mixed case. 24
Petitioner initiated her discriminatory removal suit with the
MSPB but realized her claims there were so similar to her EEOC
claims that she was concerned about incurring duplicative discovery
costs. 25 Petitioner thus asked the MSPB to dismiss her case without
prejudice, and the MSPB granted such a dismissal for four months
with the right to refile thirty days after her EEOC case decision was
rendered, or by January 18, 2007, whichever occurred first. 26 The
EEOC judge terminated the EEOC proceeding and returned
petitioner’s case for DOL to decide, after the judge determined that
petitioner had engaged in bad-faith conduct during discovery. 27 Six

20

Id. “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any such case filed
under any such [statute] must be filed within 30 days after the date the individual
filing the case received notice of the judicially reviewable action under such section
7702.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) (2012). See infra text accompanying note 38
(language of § 7702).
21
Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 602.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 602–03.
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months later, in November of 2007, DOL found against petitioner on
all of the claims. 28 Petitioner filed a timely appeal for the DOL
ruling, but MSPB declined to treat it as an ordinary appeal,
dismissing petitioner’s appeal as an attempt to reopen her expired
MSPB case. 29
Petitioner then brought an action against DOL in federal
district court, where the court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. 30 Because petitioner’s case was dismissed on procedural
grounds, the court found that she should have sought review under
the Federal Circuit, pursuant to section 7703(b)(1). 31 Only where
MSPB decided petitioner’s discriminatory claims on the merits,
could petitioner file in federal district court. 32 The Eighth Circuit
concurred, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Secretary
of Labor’s interpretation was inconsistent with the natural reading of
sections 7703(b)(1) and 7703(b)(2). 33
The Secretary argued that CSRA intended to limit the district
court to MSPB merit decisions and to procedural rulings to the
Federal Circuit because the section 7703(b)(2) exception for mixed
cases applies only when the MSPB’s decision in a mixed case is a
“judicially reviewable action” under section 7702. 34 Additionally,
the Secretary argued that section 7702(a)(3) defines what “judicially
reviewable actions” are and, read together with section 7702(a)(1),
excludes procedural decisions from the realm of “judicially
reviewable actions.” 35 This conclusion is reached by reading two
sections of CSRA together. 36 Section 7702(a)(3) states, “any
decision of the Board under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be
a judicially reviewable action as of . . . the date of issuance of the
decision.” 37 Section 7702(a)(1) states the time limit by which the

28

Id. at 603.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 604.
34
Id.; see supra note 20 (language of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) (2012)).
35
Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 605.
36
Id.
37
Id. (emphasis added).
29
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MSPB has to “decide both the issue of discrimination and the
appealable action in accordance with the Board’s appellate
procedures . . . .” 38 DOL first contends that the “issue of
discrimination” in section 7702(a)(1) can only be a decision of the
Board when it is decided on the merits; a procedural decision is not a
decision of the Board. 39 Secondly, because it is not a decision of the
Board, then under 7702(a)(3) it is also not a “judicially reviewable
action.” 40 The Supreme Court rejected such a reading, holding that
DOL failed to explain why Congress would have “constructed such
an obscure path” to achieve the simple result of directing procedural
reviews to the Federal Circuit. 41
Impact:
This case demonstrates that courts can reject DOL’s
interpretation of a statute if the agency’s construction is inconsistent
with the natural reading of the statute. 42 Furthermore, the case
clarifies the law for all mixed cases filed under the CSRA: when the
employee-complainant opts for judicial review of an MSPB decision,
the federal district court, rather than the Federal Circuit, is the
appropriate venue for appeal on not only merits-based cases but also
dismissals based on procedural grounds. 43

Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,
133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013)
Synopsis:
In September 2006, respondent Northwestern Environmental
Defense Center (NEDC) filed suit against certain corporations that
were engaged in logging and paper-production (including petitioner

38

Id. (quoting § 7702(a)(1)).
Id. at 605.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See id. at 604.
43
Id. at 607.
39
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Georgia-Pacific West) and state and local governments and officials
(including petitioner State Forester of Oregon, Doug Decker). 44 The
suit alleged that petitioners had violated the Clean Water Act for
discharging channeled stormwater runoff into two Oregon rivers
without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit. 45 The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, concluding that the
“ditches, culverts, and channels” that carried the runoff were not
point sources of pollution and petitioners were thus exempt from the
NPDES permitting scheme. 46 The Ninth Circuit reversed in favor of
respondents, 47 finding that the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) Silvicultural Rule, which defined what categories of
discharges were point sources, 48 was ambiguous on whether the
conveyances at issue were point sources. 49 The Ninth Circuit further
held that petitioners had been in violation of the Act because their
discharges were from point sources that are not exempt from the
NPDES permitting scheme under the EPA’s Industrial Stormwater
Rule. 50 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the EPA’s
interpretation was a permissible one and thus the discharges did not
require a NPDES permit. 51
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
Oregon’s abundant rainfall carries a large amount of dirt and
crushed gravel from forest logging roads into a system of ditches,
culverts, and channels that discharge into streams and rivers. 52 This
stormwater runoff is a source of water pollution containing sediment

44

Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1333 (2013).
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1333–34.
48
Id. at 1331.
49
Id. at 1333.
50
Id. at 1334.
51
Id. at 1338.
52
Id. at 1333.
45
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that can degrade water quality and harm aquatic life. 53 While Oregon
owns and controls the logging roads in the Tillamook State Forest,
the logging and paper-product firms are contractually obligated to
maintain the roads that they use to haul timber. 54 NEDC invoked the
Clean Water Act’s citizen suit-provision, 55 and sued petitioners for
causing “discharges of channeled stormwater runoff into two
waterways—the South Fork Trask River and the Little South Fork
Kilchis River.” 56 In its suit, NEDC alleged that the logging firms
violated the Act by failing to obtain NPDES permits. 57
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 58 also known as the
Clean Water Act, was enacted in 1972 to regulate the discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters. 59 The Act made it unlawful for
water to be discharged from a point source without the required
NPDES permit and defined “point source” to include any “ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit . . . from which pollutants are or may be
discharged.” 60 To clarify the law, the EPA issued new regulations
such as the Silviculture Rule, 61 which defined “point sources” with
more precision. 62 The Silviculture Rule brought “any discharge from
a logging-related source that qualifies as a point source” within the
NEDC permitting scheme. 63
Congress modified the Silviculture Rule by adding statutory
exemptions for certain stormwater runoffs, including “discharges
composed entirely of stormwater.” 64 The general exemption does not

53

Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1191 (D. Or.
2007), rev’d, 640 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Decker v. Nw. Envtl.
Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
54
Id.
55
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
56
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333.
57
Id.
58
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1274 (2006).
59
Summary of the Clean Water Act, U.S. EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-clean-water-act (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
60
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006)).
61
40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (2012).
62
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1331–32.
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apply to all stormwater discharges, however. 65 Congress also
directed the EPA to continue regulating industrial stormwater
discharges. 66 Accordingly, the EPA issued the Industrial Stormwater
Rule, which defined stormwater discharge as any discharge that is
“directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials
storage areas at an industrial plant.” 67 The Industrial Stormwater
Rule explicitly included discharges from “immediate access roads
and rail lines used or traveled by carriers of raw materials,
manufactured products, waste material, or by-products used or
created by the facility.” 68 The Industrial Stormwater Rule names
certain industries—which are classified as Standard Industrial
Classification 24—as industrial activities covered by the rule. 69
Standard Industrial Classification 24 encompasses the “Logging”
industry, which it identifies as “[e]stablishments primarily engaged in
cutting timber and in producing . . . primary forest or wood raw
materials.” 70
The Industrial Stormwater Rule underwent an
amendment three days before this case was argued before the Court,
but it was not germane to this decision as the Court refused to
conduct a “first view” on the amended regulation. 71 However, the
Court stated that the new regulation does not render moot the current
suit because petitioners might still be liable for their past violations
under the pre-amended regulation. 72
NEDC argued that the general exemption did not apply in this
case because harvesting timber is unambiguously an “industrial”
activity that triggers the application of the EPA’s Industrial
Stormwater Rule. 73 NEDC contended that support could be found in

65

Id. at 1332.
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (2006) (stating that a “discharge
associated with industrial activity” is an exception to the general exemption for
discharges consisting entirely of stormwater).
67
Id.
68
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006)).
69
Id.
70
Id. (emphasis added) (citing the DEPT. OF LABOR, STANDARD
INDUSTRIAL
CLASSIFICATIONS
MANUAL,
available
at
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013)).
71
Id. at 1332, 1335.
72
Id. at 1335.
73
Id. at 1336.
66
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the Industrial Stormwater Rule itself, as the regulation included
discharges from “immediate access roads . . . used or traveled by
carriers of raw materials.” 74 NEDC also pointed out that the
Industrial Stormwater Rule included “[f]acilities classified as
Standard Industrial Classificatio[n] 24,” of which “logging” was
included. 75 The EPA disputed this interpretation, arguing that the
Industrial Stormwater regulation’s reference to “facilities,” and the
Standard Industrial Classification 24’s reference to “establishments,”
both demonstrated that the Rule was intended to regulate discharges
from industrial sites “more fixed and permanent than outdoor timberharvesting operations.” 76 The Supreme Court determined that, while
the regulation could be read either NEDC’s or the EPA’s way, the
EPA’s interpretation would prevail and exempt the NPDES permit
requirement for discharges of stormwater runoff from logging
roads. 77 “Auer deference” 78 to the EPA’s interpretation of its own
regulation was appropriate because the agency had been consistent in
its view that permits were not required for the types of discharges at
issue. 79
The Supreme Court further held that the EPA’s
interpretation was a permissible one, not one that was “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” 80

74

Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006)); see supra text
accompanying note 67 (language of the Industrial Stormwater Rule).
75
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336 (alteration in original) (quoting 40 C.F.R. §
122.26(b)(14)); see supra text accompanying note 68 (language of the Standard
Industrial Classification 24).
76
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1336–37.
77
Id. at 1337.
78
Auer deference means that when Congress has not directly spoken to the
specific issue, courts must sustain the agency’s approach as long as it is a
permissible construction of the relevant statute. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
457 (1997) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984)).
79
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1337; see Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (holding that the Department of Labor’s new
interpretation of its regulation was not accorded deference because the Court found
it was a post hoc justification adopted in response to litigation).
80
Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1337 (quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy,
131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011)).
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Impact:
With this decision, the Supreme Court reaffirms Auer
deference to agency decisions, which is an issue that goes “to the
heart of administrative law.” 81 This case shows that the EPA’s
authority, as an agency, to interpret its own regulations will continue
to enjoy deference unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” 82
Furthermore, this case
establishes that, even where amendments to regulations at issue are
made, a justiciable controversy remains because liability may still
attach under the earlier version of the regulation. 83

Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center,
133 S. Ct. 817 (2013)
Synopsis:
Hospitals sought review of ten-year-old Medicare
reimbursement payments but were denied review by the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 84 HHS
rejected the providers’ claims based on untimeliness, as provided
under 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3). 85 The district court dismissed the
hospitals’ claims, holding that equitable tolling did not apply because
Congress did not provide for it anywhere in the statute. 86 The court
of appeals reversed, making a contrary finding that nothing in the
statute indicated that Congress precluded equitable tolling and,
furthermore, the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling that
applies to suits against private defendants should apply to suits

81

Id. at 1339 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1337 (majority opinion) (quoting McCoy, 131 S. Ct. at 880).
83
Id. at 1335.
84
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 821 (2013).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 823; see also Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d
55, 70 (D.D.C. 2010), rev’d, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 817
(2013).
82
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against the United States. 87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
the Secretary of HHS to resolve a conflict among courts of appeals
deciding whether the 180-day time limit stated in § 1395oo(a)(3) was
jurisdictional and whether equitable tolling applies to healthcare
providers’ Medicare reimbursement appeals to the Provider
Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB). 88
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
The Medicare program reimburses a fixed amount per person
for certain inpatient services that hospitals provide for Medicare
beneficiaries. 89 To offset higher per-patient costs incurred by lowerincome patients, Congress authorized an upward adjustment of the
total reimbursement amount for hospitals with a “disproportionate
share” of low-income patients. 90 The Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services’s (CMS) calculation of the Supplemental Security
Income fraction (SSI fraction) for each participating hospital in part
determines the disproportionate share adjustment to which each
hospital is entitled. 91 The CMS submits the numbers to government
contractors known as fiscal intermediaries, which calculate the total
payment due to each hospital. 92 Upon receipt of the Notice of
Program Reimbursement (NPR) informing the provider how much it
will be reimbursed, the hospital has 180 days to appeal to the
PRRB. 93 The problem in this case arose from the CMS’s erroneous
omission of several categories of SSI data from its calculations,
which resulted in the underpayment of healthcare providers for many
years. 94 The mistake was not disclosed to all affected providers until
March 2006, at which time the hospitals in this case filed a complaint

87

Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 823; see also Sebelius, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir.
2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).
88
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824.
89
Id. at 822.
90
Id.
91
Id. The SSI fraction is determined by the percentage of patients served
by the hospital who are eligible for SSI payments. Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3) (2006).
94
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 822–23.
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with the PRRB within 180 days, seeking readjustment of
reimbursements for the years 1987 through 1994. 95
The PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction because it had no
equitable powers other than what was authorized by Congress or the
Secretary. 96 The Secretary’s regulation permits the PRRB to extend
the 180-day time limit upon a showing of good cause, but states that
such an extension cannot be granted if the request for appeal is filed
more than three years after the NPR was mailed to the provider.97
The district court held that equitable tolling was not available, but the
court of appeals disagreed. 98 Upon the Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari, three positions were briefed: (1) that the 180-day limitation
for appeals to the PRRB is “jurisdictional,” and therefore HHS and
the courts cannot step into Congress’s shoes to extend it; (2) that the
Secretary has the authority to limit appeals to the PRRB to three
years; and (3) the doctrine of equitable tolling applies because the
Secretary failed to disclose information that prevented the injured
parties from making a timely appeal. 99
Addressing the jurisdictional argument, the Supreme Court
noted the importance of reining in the use of “jurisdiction,” 100 and
applied the bright line rule for determining whether a statutory
limitation is jurisdictional. A rule is jurisdictional where Congress
has “clearly stated” that the rule is jurisdictional. 101 If Congress has
not made a clear statement, as interpreted by context or explicit
language, courts shall treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional. 102 The
Court found that the language of § 1395oo(a)(3) “hardly reveals a
design to preclude any regulatory extension” and, furthermore, the
Court has repeatedly held that filing deadlines, such as §
1395oo(a)(3)’s 180-day deadline, were ordinarily not jurisdictional

95

Id. at 823.
Id.
97
Id. at 822; see also 42 CFR § 405.1841(b) (2007).
98
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 823.
99
Id.
100
Because objections to a tribunal may be raised at any time, tardy
jurisdictional objections can waste adjudicatory resources and disarm litigants. Id.
at 824.
101
Id.
102
Id.
96
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but “quintessential claim-processing rules.” 103
Additionally, a
nonjurisdictional requirement “does not become jurisdictional simply
because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains
jurisdictional provisions.” 104
The Supreme Court addressed the equitable tolling argument
along with the argument regarding the Secretary’s authority to limit
the time of appeal to the PRRB, 105 as the Secretary’s regulation
explicitly precludes an extension of the deadline past three years,
which inhibits the application of equitable tolling. The Court noted
that Congress gave the Secretary the rulemaking authority to
administer Medicare and applied Chevron deference, stating that it
had no authority to overturn the Secretary’s regulation unless it was
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 106 The
Secretary’s regulation passed this test because it advanced the
parties’ interest of finality in reimbursement decisions. 107
The Court also specifically addressed the court of appeals’
holding, which was based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Irwin
v. Department of Veterans Affairs. 108 In Irwin, the Court held that
“the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to
suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the
United States.” 109 The Court stated that the principle did not apply in
this case because the presumption of equitable tolling applied only
where Congress would have intended it to apply. 110 Not only did
Congress leave out statutory exemptions when it initially imposed the
180-day deadline, Congress left the provision untouched throughout
six amendments over the past forty years. 111 Additionally, the
Secretary has prohibited the PRRB from extending that deadline for
nearly forty years as well, and Congress never expressed disapproval
103

Id. at 824–25.
Id. at 825 (citing Gonzales v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012)).
105
Id. at 826.
106
Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (stating Chevron deference is owed to the agency where
Congress has explicitly left a gap in the laws for the agency to fill by regulation)).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 827; see Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
109
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 827 (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96).
110
Id.
111
Id.
104
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of that regulation. 112 Lastly, § 1395oo(a)(3) was not meant to be
protective of claimants, which are “‘sophisticated’ institutional
providers assisted by legal counsel,” and which nonetheless are
permitted to apply equitable tolling to address claims of “fraud or
similar fault.” 113 Thus, the Court held, § 1395oo(a)(3) was not a
jurisdictional issue that precluded the Secretary’s interpretation; and
moreover, the Secretary’s preclusion of equitable tolling under §
1395oo(a)(3) was permissible. 114
Impact:
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to
clarify that the Court’s decision in this case does not generally
preclude the use of the equitable tolling doctrine in administrative
appeals. 115 As the Court stated, Congress’s intent is the key
determination as to whether equitable tolling is available. 116 Overall,
this case not only more narrowly impacts the ability of healthcare
providers to appeal their reimbursement determinations to the PRRB
after the three-year deadline, 117 it also broadly impacts the way lower
courts will analyze the application of the equitable tolling doctrine in
other contexts.

UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL
Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC,
729 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Cable companies petitioned for review of the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2011 Revision of the

112

Id.
Id. at 828.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
116
Id.
117
See id. at 824 (majority opinion).
113
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Commission’s Program Carriage Rules (2011 FCC Order). 118 The
2011 FCC Order, which was promulgated under the Communications
Act of 1934 (Communications Act) and amended by the Cable
Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act),
directed the FCC to “establish regulations governing program
carriage agreements and related practices” between the cable
companies and the video programming vendors (also known as
“networks”), from which they purchased content. 119 At issue was the
2011 FCC Order’s new standstill rule that required a cable company
to maintain certain preexisting contracts for a specified period of
time. 120 The cable companies challenged the order in two ways, by
arguing that (1) the order violated their First Amendment right to free
speech because it restricted the editorial determinations of the cable
companies concerning what networks to provide to their
subscribers, 121 and (2) the order’s standstill rule violated the noticeand-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 122 The Second Circuit denied the petitions in part regarding
the First Amendment challenge and granted the petition in part
regarding the APA challenge. 123 The court also vacated without
prejudice the FCC’s standstill rule, to allow the FCC to repromulgate the rule in a manner consistent with the APA. 124

118

Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC, 729 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 145.
120
Id. at 150.
121
Id. at 145. This summary will not address the arguments of the First
Amendment challenge regarding the 2011 FCC Order’s revision of the 1993 FCC
Order’s requirements for a prima facie case brought by an unaffiliated video
programming vendor. See id. at 147–49, 154–68.
122
Id. at 150.
123
Id. at 171.
124
Id. The APA requires agencies to provide notice and an opportunity
for public comment as a prerequisite to promulgating a rule. Id. at 167; see also 5
U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2006).
119
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Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
A. The Anticompetitive Video Programming Industry and
Congress’s Attempt to Curb It Via the Cable Act
The video programming industry consists of networks such as
ESPN, Bravo, and CNN, “which create or acquire [content], such as
television shows and movies . . . .” 125 They sell the content to
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs), which
include cable operators, direct broadcast satellite providers, and
phone companies. 126 They also sell content to online video
distributors (OVDs). 127 When Congress enacted the Cable Act in
1992, cable operators dominated the MVPD market in the United
States, where cable companies enjoyed a local monopoly in one or
more geographical regions. 128 For example, to this day, Comcast
continues to have a stronghold over “the mid-Atlantic, Chicago,
Denver, and Northern California,” while Time Warner’s subscribers
are “clustered in New York, . . . the Carolinas, Ohio, Southern
California, . . . and Texas.” 129 Not only did this phenomenon
discourage competition, it also created “bottleneck” control for cable
companies. 130 The anticompetitive power of the cable companies
was further enhanced by pervasive vertical integration of the market,
which is done when a cable company acquires ownership interest in
both the programming and distribution system. 131 For instance,
Comcast has ownership interests in fifty national networks, including
Bravo, E! Entertainment TV, CNBC, and The Weather Channel.132
These “affiliated” networks are presumed to enjoy greater advantage

125

Time Warner, 729 F.3d at 143.
Id. at 143–44.
127
Id. at 143.
128
Id. at 145.
129
Id. at 153 (citing Annual Assessment of the Status of Completion in the
Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 27 FCC Rcd. 8610, 8628–29 n.96
(2012)).
130
Time Warner, 729 F.3d at 145. “Bottleneck” control is defined as a
cable company’s ability to prevent its subscribers from accessing programs it chose
to exclude. Id.
131
Id. at 146.
132
Id.
126
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with the cable operators than unaffiliated networks. 133 On the other
hand, Congress also considered contrary evidence that vertical
integration stimulated the development of programming. 134 Thus,
instead of enacting an outright ban on vertical integration, Congress
instead chose to bar cable operators from “discriminating against
unaffiliated programmers” to reduce their anticompetitive power. 135
Section 616(a)(3) of the Communications Act gives the FCC
clear authority to establish regulations that “govern[] program
carriage agreements and related practices” between cable operators
and MVPDs and networks.” 136 The statute specifies that the
regulations shall contain provisions designed to prevent MVPDs
from “discriminating in video programming distribution on the basis
of affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors.” 137 Section 616(a)(5)
authorizes the FCC to provide penalties and remedies for such
violations, “including carriage.” 138
B. The 2011 FCC Order and the APA Challenge to Its New
Standstill Rule
In 2007, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making
(NPRM) as a part of the notice-and-comment procedure to solicit
comments on (1) the clarification of the elements of a prima facie
section 616(a)(3) violation and (2) the adoption of rules to address
the complaint process. 139 Regarding the latter, the FCC also
requested comment on the adoption of rules to protect networks
“from potential retaliation if they file a complaint,” and the
appropriateness of the existing penalties for section 616(a)(3)
violations. 140
The 2011 FCC Order pronounced a new prima facie standard
and created a standstill rule. 141 The prima facie standard complied

133

Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 147.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 145 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 536(a) (2006)).
137
Id. at 146 (quoting § 536(a)(3)).
138
Id. (quoting § 536(a)(5)).
139
Id. at 148.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 149.
134
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with the APA requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking and
thus will not be discussed here. The standstill rule, on the other hand,
was met with an APA challenge for its failure to adhere to the noticeand-comment requirements. 142 In substance, the standstill rule
allowed the FCC to grant requests to order a MVPD to temporarily
maintain its preexisting contract on unchanged terms with a program
carriage complainant seeking renewal of the contract. 143 The purpose
of this rule was two-fold: (1) to prevent retaliation against a
programming vendor who has filed a legitimate section 616(a)(3)
claim of discrimination; and (2) to help networks resist the carriage
demands of MVPDs, especially demands that violate the program
carriage rules. 144
The FCC denied that notice-and-comment rulemaking applied
to the standstill rule, arguing that the rule was one of agency
“procedure” rather than of “substance,” as it codified a preexisting
procedure to vindicate rights given under section 616(a)(3). 145 The
Second Circuit disagreed, stating that the test for whether a rule may
be categorized as “procedural” depends on whether the “substantive
effect [of the rule] is sufficiently grave” so as to justify public
participation “to ensure the agency has all pertinent information
before it when making a decision.” 146 The standstill rule does not fall
into this procedural exception because it confers authority to the FCC
to temporarily extend a contractual agreement, which significantly
affects the substantive rights of the parties involved, namely the
MVPD and the unaffiliated network that has a pending complaint
before the FCC. 147
In any event, the FCC contended that the standstill rule
complied with the APA because it was a “logical outgrowth” of the
2007 NPRM’s solicitation for comments on whether the FCC should
adopt rules to protect networks “from potential retaliation if they file
a complaint.” 148 The Second Circuit also rejected this argument,
142

Id. at 167.
Id. at 150.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 168 (quoting Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
147
Id.
148
Id. at 150.
143
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holding that the 2007 NPRM solicitations were “too general to
provide adequate notice” that the FCC was contemplating a standstill
rule. 149 The strongest supporting fact for this finding of insufficient
notice is that none of the public commenters addressed the role
pursuant to the 2007 NPRM. 150 Finally, the court juxtaposed the
present case with the FCC’s express solicitation of comments
concerning the adoption of a standstill rule for another provision
under the Cable Act. 151 The court concluded that the standstill rule
promulgated in the 2011 FCC Order was substantive and, thus,
subject to proper notice-and-comment procedures, which were
lacking in this case. 152
Impact:
The Second Circuit’s decision vacating the 2011 FCC Order
may have broad free speech and economic impact for the national
video programming industry. Properly promulgated, it impacts the
substantive rights of video programming vendors, their distributors,
and ultimately the subscribers. With this holding, it is unclear
whether the rule will in fact come to fruition following a proper
notice-and-comment procedure.
This case also provides a
demonstration that where even temporary substantive rights are
conferred—arguably to further agency procedure—the procedural
exception to the notice-and-comment rule does not apply. This case
further provides a useful “logical outgrowth” analysis to determine
whether a solicitation satisfies APA requirements.

149

Id. at 170.
Id.
151
Id. at 170–71.
152
Id. at 171.
150
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Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. NLRB,
721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Chambers of commerce challenged a rule promulgated by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), arguing that the NLRB
lacked authority to enact such a rule. 153 The NLRB defended its
rulemaking authority, contending the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 154 vests in the NLRB the authority to enact the rule
“requir[ing] employers subject to the [NLRA] . . . to post an official
Board notice informing employees of their rights under the Act.” 155
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina held that
the NLRB had exceeded its authority, and granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs. 156 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court that the NLRA’s rulemaking function was limited to “its
statutorily defined reactive roles in addressing unfair labor practice
charges and conducting representation elections upon request.”157
Therefore, the court concluded that the NLRB had no authority to
promulgate the challenged rule. 158
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
The NLRA, enacted in 1935, regulates relations between
private sector employers, labor unions, and employees. 159 Section 6
of the NLRA (Section 6), conferred rulemaking power on the NLRB,
giving it the “authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the APA], such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the
NLRA].” 160
153

Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152, 154 (4th Cir.

2013).
154

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
Chamber of Commerce of U.S., 721 F.3d at 154.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 155 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).
155
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On August 30, 2011, the NLRB promulgated a regulation
titled “Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor
Relations Act.” 161 The Chamber of Commerce of the United States
and the South Carolina Chamber of Commerce (collectively,
“Chambers”) challenged the rule in federal district court, asking for
injunctive relief against the NLRB. 162 The NLRB made its argument
on two distinct legal bases.
First, according to Mourning v. Family Publications Service,
163
Inc., Section 6’s rulemaking grant required the NLRB’s rules to be
upheld if they “reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation.” 164 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that
Mourning applies only where the court has already affirmed that
Congress had delegated interpretative powers to the agency. 165 Here,
it was at issue whether Congress had in fact delegated interpretative
powers to the agency. 166
Second, the NLRB’s broad rulemaking authority under
Section 6 was affirmed by the Supreme Court in American Hospital
Ass’n v. NLRB. 167 As such, the NLRB should have the power to
promulgate rules as it sees fit, except where Congress has expressly
withheld that authority. 168 The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument
as well, stating that the NLRB’s rulemaking authority, found in
American Hospital Ass’n, was in fact limited. 169 In American
Hospital Ass’n, the Court upheld the NLRB’s promulgated rule,
which proactively defined whether a designated unit was appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining. 170 The NLRB had
authority to make such a rule because section 9(a) of the NLRA
granted authority to the NLRB to make bargaining unit

161

Id. at 156.
Id. at 157.
163
411 U.S. 356 (1973).
164
Chamber of Commerce of U.S., 721 F.3d at 158 (quoting Mourning,
411 U.S. at 369).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
499 U.S. 606 (1991).
168
Chamber of Commerce of U.S., 721 F.3d at 159.
169
Id. at 164.
170
Id. at 159.
162
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determinations “in each case.” 171 Section 9(a), read in conjunction
with Section 6’s rulemaking provision, gave the NLRB the power to
create a general rule that categorically makes decisions on behalf of
the NLRB, precluding the need for the NLRB to make case-by-case
adjudications. 172 Moreover, the grant of authority in American
Hospital Ass’n was narrow. 173 In sum, the Fourth Circuit stated that
the NLRB was not free to promulgate any rule as it sees fit absent a
grant of rulemaking authority from Congress. 174
Applying the Chevron analysis, 175 the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that Congress did not give the NLRA rulemaking authority to make
the notice-posting rule here pursuant to the APA’s notice-andcomment procedure. 176 First, congressional intent could not be found
in the plain language of the statute. 177 Section 6 “grants the [NLRB]
authority to issue rules that are ‘necessary to carry out’ provisions of
the Act.” 178 The ambiguity of the term “necessary” did not indicate
congressional delegation of authority. 179 Secondly, the structure of
the NLRA revealed that none of the provisions showed that Congress
intended to give the NLRB this type of rulemaking authority. 180 On a
broader context, the NLRB serves only two “expressly reactive
roles”: (1) to conduct representative elections and (2) to resolve
unfair labor practice charges. 181 Read more specifically, none of the
provisions gave the NLRB the authority to make the notice-posting
rule. 182 The Fourth Circuit even rejected the NLRB’s argument that

171

Id.
Id.
173
Id. at 160.
174
Id.
175
The Chevron analysis requires: (1) using “‘traditional tools of statutory
construction’ to ascertain congressional intent” and (2) if the statute is silent on the
issue, then asking “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
176
Id. at 154, 161.
177
Id. at 160–61.
178
Id. at 160 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006)).
179
Id. at 161–62.
180
Id. at 162.
181
Id.
182
See id. at 162–63.
172
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it had authority from Section 6 to make the failure to follow the
notice-posting rule an unfair labor practice as defined by section
8(a)(1). 183 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that this “bootstrapping”
would not be allowed. 184 Thirdly, the legislative history of the Act
did not provide evidence of the NLRB’s alleged power to enact the
notice-posting rule. 185 Not only do early versions of the Act indicate
that only a reactive role was intended for the NLRB, Congress has
also considered and rejected another notice provision for the
NLRA. 186 Finally, the history of regulation in this area shows that
Congress has not intended for the NLRB to have authority to make a
notice-posting rule, as several federal labor statutes passed between
1936 and 1974—the date of the last NLRB amendment—provide for
the posting of notices. 187 One labor law was even amended to
impose such a requirement. 188 By contrast, the NLRA’s three
amendments remain without a notice-posting provision.189
Therefore, the NLRB’s notice-posting rule is invalid for going
beyond the NLRB’s limited scope of rulemaking authority. 190
Impact:
This decision specifically denies the NLRB power to
promulgate a notice-posting rule. 191 More significantly, it clarifies
the scope of NLRB’s rulemaking authority, limiting it to the NLRB’s
ability to conduct representative elections and to resolve unfair labor
practice charges. 192 Above all, it provides that where Congress has
not expressly defined the boundaries of an agency’s power, courts
183

Id. at 163.
Id.
185
Id. at 164.
186
Id. at 164–65. The contemplated notice requirement proposed to
require any employer that was party to a NLRA-conflicting contract “to notify its
employees of the violation and indicate the contract would be abrogated.” Id. at
165.
187
Id. at 165–66.
188
Id. at 166.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 154, 166.
191
Id. at 154.
192
Id.
184
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have the authority to draw those boundaries by extrapolating
Congress’s intent. 193

Shweika v. Department of Homeland Security,
723 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Applicant prosecuted a single application for naturalization
before the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) and the District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. 194 Because USCIS denied applicant’s petition, applicant
continued to pursue his case in district court, where a de novo review
of the denial was conducted. 195 The district court also raised the
issue of whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the
application, as it was unclear whether the statute contained
administrative hearing and administrative-exhaustion requirements,
and, if so, whether the applicant had fulfilled the exhaustion
requirement allowing for district court review. 196 The district court
determined that the administrative-exhaustion requirement could be
inferred from the governing statute, the Immigration Act of 1990, and
also determined that it imposed jurisdictional limitations on a district
court. 197 Because applicant failed to complete his administrative
hearing, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide
his case. 198 The Sixth Circuit addressed the jurisdictional issues that
the district court raised as a matter of first impression and determined
that, in the absence of Congress’s clear statement to the contrary, the
administrative-hearing requirement is nonjurisdictional. 199
The

193
194

See id.
Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 723 F.3d 710, 711–12 (6th Cir.

2013).
195

Id. at 713.
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 713–14.
199
Id. at 719.
196
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circuit court remanded the case to reconsider whether the applicant
satisfied the administrative-hearing requirement. 200
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Applicant Mazen Shweika applied to become a naturalized
citizen in April 2004, but was denied a complete review for three
years. 201 Applicant obtained a writ of mandamus from the federal
district court to compel the USCIS to review his application. 202 The
USCIS denied applicant’s petition in 2008, based on his failure to
provide certified copies of documents related to a prior arrest, and
applicant then sought an administrative hearing to appeal the
denial. 203 Applicant did not receive a hearing after ten months, even
though by regulation the USCIS was required to schedule one within
180 days of a timely request. 204 Applicant then returned to district
court to seek a writ of mandamus to compel USCIS to review his
appeal and, in the alternative, he sought a hearing de novo. 205 USCIS
finally granted applicant’s administrative hearing in February 2010
and conducted a de novo review of the application, which led to
questions about a prior conviction and domestic violence allegations
made by applicant’s ex-wife. 206 Applicant left the interview at the
advice of his counsel before the completion of the hearing. 207 This
led to USCIS’s denial of the application on the basis of the record
before it and, among other things, for the applicant’s failure to
establish good moral character—a requirement for naturalization.208
Applicant resumed his case in the district court, which held its own
de novo review of the denial and determined that applicant had
established his good moral character. 209 The district court also

200

Id. at 720.
Id. at 712.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 713.
208
Id.
209
Id.
201
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ordered additional briefing to determine whether it had subject-matter
jurisdiction over applicant’s case. 210
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), a person whose application for
naturalization is denied under that subchapter can obtain a district
court’s de novo review “after a hearing before an immigration
officer under section 1447(a).” 211 At issue was whether that
language in § 1421(c) and the Immigration Act of 1990 confer an
administrative-hearing requirement. 212 The district court held that
such a requirement had been inferred for § 1421(c) and that it was a
jurisdictional restriction on the district court’s ability to grant the de
novo review. 213 The district court further read a completion
requirement into the administrative-hearing requirement. 214 Because
applicant failed to complete the administrative hearing, he did not
fulfill the administrative-exhaustion requirement of § 1421(c), and
thus the district court lacked jurisdiction over his application. 215
The Sixth Circuit began its review of applicant’s appeal by
determining whether the district court was correct in holding the
administrative-exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional. 216 This was
a matter of first impression for the court. 217 The court applied the
bright line rule stated by the Supreme Court in various cases, 218 that a
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope is jurisdictional only where
Congress clearly states that a statute is jurisdictional. 219 To discern
whether Congress spoke on the character of the requirement requires
an analysis of the limitation’s “text, context, and relevant historical
treatment.” 220

210

Id.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2012)).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 713–14.
216
Id. at 714.
217
Id. at 714–15.
218
Id. at 714 (including, most recently, Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013)).
219
Id. (citing Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824).
220
Id. (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166
(2010)).
211
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The Sixth Circuit determined that the text of the section “does
not speak in jurisdictional terms” as compared to other statutes that
also concern the district court’s role in naturalization proceedings;
rather, it lacks statements such as: “[the district] court has
jurisdiction” or district courts “shall have authority to administer.”221
As to context, the court looked to the function of the requirement to
determine whether it was meant to be jurisdictional. 222 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the administrative-hearing requirement
is a “claim-processing rule” that requires exhaustion of the
administrative proceedings, but is nonjurisdictional in almost all
cases. 223 Thus, the court concluded, “Congress has not made a clear
statement regarding jurisdiction.” 224
The circuit court then contemplated whether Chevron
deference applied in regards to the USCIS’s interpretation of the
statutory provision that confers jurisdiction on federal courts. 225 This
was also a matter of first impression for the court. 226 Adopting the
view of its sister courts, including the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth,
and D.C. Circuits, the Sixth Circuit held that “Chevron deference
does not apply to an agency’s interpretation of a federal court’s
jurisdiction.” 227 First, the conditions that license Chevron do not
apply because Chevron deference is warranted only where Congress
has vested authority in the agency, whereas a jurisdiction-conferring
statute delegates authority on federal courts. 228 Second, courts defer
to agencies because of their expertise, and here, federal courts are the
“experts when it comes to determining the scope” of subject-matter

221

Id. at 715 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1447(b), 1421(b)(1) (2012)).
Id. at 716.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 717.
225
Id. When reviewing the validity of an agency’s interpretation of a
statute that it administers, courts will apply the Chevron analysis, which requires
the court to: (1) use “‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to ascertain
congressional intent” and (2) if the statute is silent on the issue, to then ask
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
226
Id. at 718.
227
Id.
228
Id.
222
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jurisdiction. 229 Third, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a
strong presumption exists for judicial review of administrative action,
which has not been overcome by any evidence of Congress’s intent
to overcome this strong presumption. 230 Thus, the circuit court
concluded, the courts do not owe Chevron deference to the USCIS’s
decision. 231 Further, the Sixth Circuit found that Congress has not
made
§
1421(c)’s
administrative-hearing
requirement
232
jurisdictional.
Because this determination was made incorrectly at
the district court level, the circuit court remand the proceeding back
to the district court to determine “whether § 1421(c)’s administrativehearing requirement implies a completion requirement” and whether
applicant satisfied it. 233
Impact:
The Sixth Circuit determined as a matter of first impression
that § 1421(c) does not contain a jurisdictional limitation, which
confirmed the view taken by a number of circuit courts. 234 The case
also has a wider application as it provides a clear analysis showing
that Chevron deference does not apply in agency interpretations of
federal court subject-matter jurisdiction. 235

SEC v. Das,
723 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Defendant, a former chief financial officer of a publicly
traded corporation, was prosecuted under the Securities Exchange

229

Id.
Id. at 718–19.
231
Id. at 719.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 719–20.
234
Id. at 718.
235
Id. at 719.
230
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Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) for violating several securities laws. 236
The district court, after a ten-day jury trial, found defendant liable on
every claim. 237 Several issues were on appeal in the Eighth Circuit,
including whether the district court abused its discretion in
instructing the jury by omitting the requirement of scienter for the
section 14(a), Rule 14a-9, Rule 13b2-1, and Rule 13b2-2 claims.238
The Eighth Circuit rejected defendant’s argument that scienter was
required for violating those securities laws and affirmed the district
court’s jury instructions. 239
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Stormy Dean was a former chief financial officer (CFO) at
infoUSA, a publicly traded corporation headquartered in Omaha,
Nebraska. 240 infoUSA’s predecessor company was founded by
Vinod Gupta, who served as infoUSA’s chief executive officer and
chairman until 2008. 241 Gupta was discovered to have used
infoUSA’s funds to pay for his personal expenses, such as private jet
travel, yacht payments and expenses, luxury cars, membership to
thirty private country clubs, and personal life insurance policies.242
These payments were not reported in infoUSA’s filings, which Dean
certified as the company’s CFO. 243
Following an informal inquiry in late 2007, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action in
2010 against Dean and another former CFO, Rajnish Das. 244 The
action included allegations of: (1) soliciting false proxy statements in
violation of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, Rule 14a-3, and Rule
14a-9; (2) falsifying books, records, or accounts in violation of
section 13(b)(5) and Rule 13b2-1; and (3) deceiving auditors in

236

SEC v. Das, 723 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 2013).
Id.
238
Id. at 952–56.
239
Id. at 955–56.
240
Id. at 946.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 947.
243
Id.
244
Id. at 946.
237
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violation of Rule 13b2-2. 245 The U.S. District Court for the District
of Nebraska ruled in favor of the SEC on every claim and Dean
appealed. 246
One of the appeals was based on Dean’s contention that the
district court abused its discretion concerning the jury instructions by
omitting the scienter requirement for the section 14(a) and Rule 14a9 claims. 247 The jury instructions had required the SEC to
demonstrate that Dean had merely negligently approved or signed the
proxy statements that later proved to be false or misleading. 248
Relying on previous dicta and the decisions of sister courts, the
Eighth Circuit determined as a matter of first impression that scienter
was not an element of a section 14(a) or Rule 14a-9 claim against a
corporation’s officer. 249 Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s jury instructions. 250
Another basis of Dean’s appeal was whether the district court
abused its discretion as to the Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2 jury
instructions, which required the jury to find Dean liable if it
determined that he did not act “reasonably.” 251 Borrowing the
Seventh Circuit’s Chevron analysis, 252 the court rejected Dean’s
argument that the correct standard for Rule 13b2-1 was
“knowingly.” 253 When Congress amended section 13(b) to provide
that scienter was a requirement to impose criminal liability, this

245

Id. at 947.
Id. at 947–48.
247
Id. at 952.
248
Id. at 953.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 953–54.
251
Id. at 954.
252
When reviewing the validity of an agency’s interpretation of a statute
that it administers, courts will apply the Chevron analysis, which requires the court
to: (1) use “‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to ascertain congressional
intent” and (2) if the statute is silent on the issue, to then ask “whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
253
Das, 723 F.3d at 954 (citing McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 789
(7th Cir. 2006)).
246
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“plainly” implied that section 13(b) did not require the defendant take
knowing action in order to be held accountable for civil liability. 254
The court engaged in statutory interpretation regarding Rule
13b2-2 by examining the plain language of section 13(b)(2), 255 from
which Rule 13b2-2 was derived. 256 Section 13(b)(2) requires issuers
of securities to make and keep accurate records, while section
13(b)(4) states “[n]o criminal liability shall be imposed” for failure to
comply with section 13(b)(2) unless section 13(b)(5) applies.257
Section 13(b)(5) states that “[n]o person shall knowingly” falsify
records as described under section 13(b)(2). 258 The court interpreted
section 13(b)(5) as proof of Congress’s intent for “knowing” acts to
trigger the criminal liability provision contained in section
13(b)(4). 259 This, the court reasoned, indicated that “knowing” is
“otherwise not an element of a civil claim.” 260 Moreover, the court
stated that Congress did not adopt section 13(b)(5), which contains
the knowing provision, until 1988—after Rule 13b2-2 was issued. 261
Finally, the court gave substantial deference to the SEC’s
construction of its own regulations. 262 This reasoning persuaded the
court to affirm the district court’s omission of scienter from the jury
instructions at issue. 263
Impact:
In this case, the Eighth Circuit weighed in on the requirement
of scienter for important provisions of the Exchange Act, setting the
stage for a possible Supreme Court ruling on the issue. The Eighth
Circuit ruled that there is no scienter requirement to prove a section
14(a) or Rule 14a-9 claim, which is a view consistent with that of the

254

Id. (citing SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Id. at 955.
256
Id. at 956.
257
Id. at 955.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 955–56.
261
Id. at 956.
262
Id.
263
See id.
255
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Seventh, Second, and Third Circuits. 264 In agreement with the
Seventh and Second Circuits, the court also ruled that Rules 13b2-1
and 13b2-2 do not require a finding that a defendant has acted
“knowingly.” 265 This case also demonstrated that in accordance with
Chevron, the SEC’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to
substantial deference. 266

264

Id. at 954.
Id. at 954, 956.
266
Id. at 956.
265

